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This study focuses on developing a model for transfer fees paid for the players sold to the 
fifteen most valuable and the richest soccer clubs in the world. Using the data primarily 
collected from transfermarkt.com, a leading soccer database focusing on transfers and 
soccer community valuations, we ran a linear regression using five variables measuring 
popularity, monetary valuation, and productivity. Results show that variables such as 
number of Google searches, number of years on contract left, community valuation 
of a player, number of goals and assists, and race of a player significantly influence 
the transfer fee paid for a player. Moreover, it shows that the transfer fee for the most 
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Today’s soccer transfer market has grown increasingly extreme. The fees paid for 
players often seem exaggerated, especially in recent years. In summer 2017, the prices 
for players have skyrocketed. The transfer fee for Neymar exceeded 222 million euros, 
which was the highest amount ever spent for a soccer player. The general public shook 
their heads, unable to see the logic in such high fees. In other words, paying such an 
outrageous price for a soccer player simply did not make any sense (Goal.com, 2017). In 
this research paper, we examine the rationale for these high transfer payments. 
Literature Review
Several studies have analyzed the transfer fees in soccer. Carmichael and Thomas (1993) 
examined the transfer market in the English Football League and applied a bargaining 
theory to explain the transfer fees. The player characteristics in their equation were 
age, goals, general fitness, league appearances, and the position played by the player. 
Among other conclusions, the authors found that the transfer fee increased by a couple 
of percentage points by each goal or league appearance (p. 1475). In addition, they 
concluded that the transfer fees started declining after players reached 25 years of age.
Other studies incorporated bargaining elements into the equation such as those completed 
by Dobson and Gerrard (1999) and Speight and Thomas (1997). Dobson and Gerrard 
studied the inflation rate of the transfer fees between the years 1990 and 1996 as well as 
what factors determine the player’s price on the market. The main variables used were 
age, league starts, goals, number of international starts, or goal rate. Dobson and Gerrard 
(1999) differentiated between the buying club and the selling club. The authors found 
that the average rate of inflation for transfer fees was around 11% per year between 
1990 and 1996. Speight and Thomas (1997) compared the negotiated transfer fees 
with arbitration settlements. In their article, the authors used both individual predictors 
(goals, experience, fitness) as well as club variables (bargaining strength of both selling 
and buying clubs). Speight and Thomas found that, unfortunately for the selling clubs, 
arbitration settlements were lower than the potential market value, suggesting that 
the model of arbitrage was beneficial for the buying clubs who would rather wait for 
arbitration than negotiate the transfer fee.
 Dobson, Gerrard, and Howe (2000) continued the research on transfer fees using 
the negotiation aspect, this time in non-league English soccer. The player characteristics 
used were age, the number of previous clubs, the number of appearances, goals, or 
the position dummy variables. Dobson et al. again used a model which differentiated 
between the buying and selling clubs. The authors concluded that the transfer market 
in both non-league and professional soccer is very alike with broadly similar data-
generating processes. 
 Unlike Dobson, Gerrard, and Howe, who focused on non-league soccer, Frick 
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(2007) analyzed the labor market in the top five European soccer leagues. Frick criticized 
the researchers, claiming that “most of the statistics used are rather ‘indirect’ measures 
that only imperfectly reflect a player’s value to his team” (p. 426), with an exception 
of the number of assists and tackles by the player as well as the superstar effect. Frick 
also recognized footedness and the contract duration (or number of years of contract 
left) as important variables in predicting the transfer fees of the players. Frick argued 
that “the more successful the buying and/or the selling club are (either in economic 
or in sporting terms), the higher the transfer fee that the two clubs agree on” (p. 431). 
This paper confirmed conclusions drawn by the authors of the previous studies which 
incorporated bargaining elements and the power of selling and buying clubs in soccer 
economics (Carmichael & Thomas, 1993; Dobson & Gerrard, 1999; Speight & Thomas, 
1997; Dobson, Gerrard, & Howe, 2000).
 Another study that recognized contract duration as an important predictor of 
the transfer fee was done by Carmichael, Forrest, and Simmons (1999). The authors 
studied the variables that might predict transfer fees and tried to develop a model to 
determine the prices of players. Unlike other studies, Carmichael et al. included players 
that did not get transferred in their data set. They claimed that data on contract duration, 
time of expiry, and renewal are “private,” thus they could not include the variables in 
their model. The independent variables used in this study were goals, age, age squared, 
players’ positions, international starts, and several team variables. The authors found 
that some players were more likely to be transferred than others, and if the transfer 
happened, it was explained by the variables used.
 Two different approaches were used by other researchers to determine the transfer 
fees in soccer. Herm, Callsen-Bracker, and Kreis (2014) focused on the community 
approach of analysis for transfer fees, measuring how the soccer community calculates 
the transfer fee and how well the soccer community was able to predict the observed 
transfer fees. Conversely, Muller, Simons, and Weinmann (2017) focused on a data-
driven approach, predicting the market value by objective data on both performance 
and popularity. Herm et al. (2014) evaluated the accuracy of the online community in 
predicting transfer values in soccer. The authors used market values from transfermarkt.
de, which “have a good reputation in the sports industry and have a high economic 
relevance; they are used in actual transfer and salary negotiations” (p. 487). The 
variables used as indicators of the market value were age, precision, scoring, assertion, 
footedness, and several external attributes such as public attention or other clients of the 
player’s agent. The results showed that the most objective predictors of market value 
identified by the community were goals, age, percentage of successful passes, duels 
won, footedness, and the attention of general public measured by the number of the 
player’s Google search results. Muller et al. (2017), on the other hand, used a strictly 
data-driven approach and criticized the belief that the soccer community could produce 
similar or better results than using objective data. Using a data set of 4217 players from 
the top five European leagues over the course of six seasons, Muller et al. found that the 
data approach used in the model “can overcome several of crowdsourcing’s practical 
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limitations while producing comparatively accurate estimates” (p. 621), suggesting 
that the objective variables measuring performance and popularity were significant in 
determining the value of the player.
 Several studies focused on the determinants of players’ salaries instead of the 
transfer fees. Brandes and Franck (2012) studied the performance reactions of German 
soccer players to fair and unfair wage allocations. “Fair” wage would be explainable 
by the previous season’s performance as well as by age and experience. The authors 
used Opta Index, a product of a professional sports company, to analyze players 
“performance index” and used that number in their model. Brandes and Franck found 
that the deviations from the fair wage indeed influenced the players’ performance on 
the pitch. Frick (2011) also studied player remuneration and the contract duration. To 
determine the player’s salary, Frick developed an econometric model which included 
both last season’s and career statistics. Frick concluded that recent performances (last 
season) influence the salary much more than the player’s past performances. The author 
also found that region of birth was important, goalkeepers earned significantly less than 
the field players, the captaincy of the player matters as well, and, the maximum earnings 
are enjoyed by players when they are 27–28 years old.
 Another study conducted by Bryson, Frick, and Simmons (2013) explored 
footedness, which is an ability to play soccer with both feet, and connected the ability 
to players’ salaries. The authors used Kicker Magazine and transfermarkt.de data 
sets which included the top 5 European soccer leagues. Bryson et al. found that two-
footedness significantly adds to the players’ salary. Although, it does not significantly 
improve the team’s performance. Fry, Galanos, and Posso (2014) also found a certain 
premium of being a left-footed player. They studied the determinants of the players’ goal 
productivity. Fry et al. found a concave relationship between age and productivity, and 
that young, tall, left-footed strikers have the best probability of scoring a goal. 
 Productivity, the number of goals and assists of a player over the course of 
one season, nationality of the player, and popularity seem to be the main predictors of 
the “superstar effect” in soccer. Lucifora and Simmons (2003) examined the superstar 
effect in the Italian soccer league, the famous Serie A. Other than using the traditional 
variables (goals, assists, appearances), Lucifora and Simmons used two new dummy 
variables –– “superstar indicators” –– depending on the goals per game. The authors 
found that “superstar effects are generated by consumer interest in forward players who 
frequently score goals and/or create goals for their colleagues,” and this was confirmed 
by these players having higher salaries. This finding explains a general consensus in 
the soccer world: attacking players are more valuable and earn more than other players 
(Bryson, Frick, & Simmons, 2013).
 As previously mentioned, productivity does not seem to be the only component 
of the superstar effect. Bryson, Rossi, and Simmons (2014) explored how migrant 
players influence winning. The independent variables used were player’s productivity, 
age, experience, season dummies, and nationality dummies. Bryson et al. used three 
dependent variables: wages, attendance, and team points. The authors found that there 
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was a substantial wage premium for migrant soccer players which is only partially 
explained by their productivity. They concluded that the “superstar effect” indeed exists, 
suggesting that the nationality of the player matters. 
 The popularity component of the superstar effect was explored by Garcia-del-
Barrio and Pujol (2004; 2007). The data set used was Marca, a Spanish newspaper, and 
the variables used, in addition to the traditionally used goals, assists, or games played, 
included the revenue-generating capability of the player (expressed by the total number 
of links reported by Google). The authors concluded that the transfer value of players 
stemmed both from their sporting performance and their economic contribution –– 
which was one of the most surprising and relevant findings of their paper, but also one 
that absolutely makes sense; a player’s popularity and mass media presence increases 
his marketing potential.
 The conclusions by Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol were tested by Lehmann and 
Schulze (2008). The authors explored the superstar theories for the German Bundesliga 
and whether superstar status and talent explain players’ salaries. Variables used were 
goals, assists, various team dummies, players’ position, tackles, and Google searches. 
Lehmann and Schultze found that both individual performance and media presence 
significantly explained German players’ salaries. A very similar conclusion was 
reached by Franck and Nuesch (2012). The authors studied talent and popularity and 
their contribution to the team’s success. Franck and Nuesch used data from Kicker and 
transfermarkt. Specifically, they used 20 variables that determined the transfer fee and, 
thus, talent. In addition to the traditional variable, they also examined yellow and red 
cards, cross-completion rate, shots, or assists. The authors showed that both talent and 
popularity contribute to the transfer values of the players.
 The studies focusing on nationality had conflicting results. Frick, Pietzner and 
Prinz (2007) studied several questions related to the career duration in professional 
soccer. The authors used an extensive data set from Kicker, and included individual 
characteristics, position dummies, nationality dummies, and institutional environment. 
Frick et al. concluded that there seemed to be a discrimination based on nationality of 
the player regarding the career duration. For instance, South American players tend to be 
eliminated from the top German league more frequently than players from other countries.
 Pedace (2008) studied wage discrimination in the English soccer league. The 
author found that South American players tended to be overpaid even when they did 
not increase the team performance. However, they did increase attendance. Findings by 
Wilson and Yung-Hsiang (2003) seemed to suggest the opposite. The authors analyzed 
nationality discrimination in the five largest soccer leagues. Wilson and Yung-Hsiang 
concluded that players from Balkan or South America increase performance of the team. 
However, these players were under-represented in the teams despite having positive 
influence on attendance and teams’ performances. This might indicate bias from owners 
of the soccer clubs.
 When it comes to a race of the player, results were also conflicting. Reilly and 
Witt (1995) explored the element of race in the transfer fees. The authors included a 
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number of performance variables, differentiated between the divisions of buying and 
selling clubs, and included a dummy variable if the player was black. Reilly and Witt 
found that there was very little evidence of discrimination in transfer fees of these 
players. However, the study did not exclude possible discrimination in other forms.
 Szymanski (2000) proposed a market test for racial discrimination in English 
soccer leagues. The author considered several variables indicating players’ performance 
such as age, career length, goals scored, or player’s position on the pitch. The results 
suggested that the clubs which were underrepresented by black players performed 
worse than other clubs, thus concluding that owners “have paid a premium in the player 
market” (p. 601) by discriminating against black players.
Theoretical Model
This study used a community-driven approach rather than a data-driven approach 
to analyze transfer fees for soccer players and to focus solely on the top 15 richest 
soccer clubs in the world; the choice of variables was highly influenced by this focus 
(which is a big difference between our study and studies done before despite sharing 
a similarity of researching transfer fees and related variables). Players coming to big 
clubs are usually well known before making the transfer –– thus their market value, 
the specifics of their contract, or the players’ popularity measured by their exposure in 
media are also well known and were suggested in our literature review to be crucial in 
determining the players’ transfer fees. Our literature review often discussed goals and 
assists as variables included in various studies; they essentially suggest productivity in 
soccer, thus inclusion of such variables are crucial. The race variable is also significant 
in our analysis since past research suggests that clubs enjoy significant premium in team 
performance from non-white players despite their underrepresentation in soccer clubs. 
Due to the size of our sample, inclusion of certain performance (tackles, yellow and red 
cards, or passing accuracy) and non-performance (international starts, nationality) data 
would not bring anything to the model since the community might include that in their 
market value estimates. 
 Therefore, our general model is as follows:
Fee = β1 + β2MarketValue + β3ContractLeft + β4GoogleResults + β5Productivity + 
β6Race   + ε,




Table 1: Independent Variables
 
 There are 5 independent variables in our model. MarketValue indicates 
the value of the player at the time of the transfer (not at time of collecting data), as 
reported by transfermarkt.com. The market value decided by the community members 
according to the judge principle –– a method of deciding the market value of the player 
hierarchically by selecting a judge who evaluates inputs from community members and 
has the final say on what market value is reported on the website –– can be considered 
as a good estimate of the players’ true values (Herm et al., 2014; Muller et al., 2017). 
Transfermarkt.com market values are based on the community judgment (Herm et al., 
2014). The expected sign is positive since we expect a positive correlation between the 
transfer fee and the community-determined transfer value. 
 ContractLeft is a number in years suggesting how many years a player has 
left on his contract; in other words, it shows how long a player has to play for his 
current club before becoming a free agent. Usually, however, players never reach free 
agency as the players are sold for at least some kind of monetary compensation before 
their contracts expire, circumventing a player leaving “for free.” The selling clubs hold 
more power when they have the player signed for four years rather than for one –– the 
expected sign is therefore positive. The more years the players have on their contract, 
the higher a transfer fee can be demanded for the player.
 GoogleResults is the number of Google results when searching for a specific 
player on Google. The method for collecting these searches was previously used in 
various research articles (Garcia-del-Barrio, Pujol, 2004; 2007) and is as follows: 
“[name of the player]” AND “[the name of the selling club]” AND “football.” We always 
searched by the name in the headline reported on the player’s page on transfermarkt.
com. Likewise, in all cases, the name of the selling club used was not the official full 
name of the club (for instance, Real Madrid, Club Futbol), but rather the headline name 
on the club’s official page on transfermarkt.com. This number is supposed to measure 
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popularity of players in our data set as well as their potential marketing value for the 
new club. The expected sign is positive since the more popular a player is, the more 
value on the market he might be expected to have in reality.
 Productivity measures the sum of goals and assists of a player the season before 
being transferred to a new club. Although assists are often not given the same importance 
as goals, they are equally important for the productivity of a team, as generally there 
would not be a goal without a pass preceding it. Moreover, while some attacking players 
score more, some provide assists, and both types of players are equally valuable to the 
team. As a result, we decided to create one variable from goals and assists, giving them 
equal importance. The expected sign is positive –– the more goals and assists the player 
has, the more expensive he will be on the transfer market. 
 Lastly, race is a dummy variable with two possible values –– 1 if a player is 
originated from the African continent or is a descendant of people from Africa (further 
referred to as “black”), and 0 if a player is “non-black,” which includes players that 
do not fit the definition of the Race variable having value of 1. The rationale behind 
this grouping is the reason that it was used similarly in previous studies by Szymanski 
(2000) and Reilly and Witt (1995). The expected sign is positive, since it was suggested 
by Szymanski (2000) that enjoy significant premium in team performance by signing 
black players (p. 602).
 All of the independent variables are expected to have a positive linear relationship 
with the dependent variable, the fee paid for the player.
Data
The main source of data for this study was the website transfermarkt.com which is 
widely recognized as one of the most reliable sources for soccer data and has been 
used as a data source for numerous past studies (Bryson et al., 2013; 2014; Franck 
and Nuesch, 2012; Herm et al., 2014; Muller et al., 2017). All data was obtained in 
the month of October 2017, and the data did not include the current season which is 
reasonable since we need to measure player’s performance, productivity, and popularity 
before the transfer, not after. For the GoogleResults variable, we used Google.com, and 
the data was collected on November 7, 2017.
 There are 49 players in our sample, and all made a transfer in the 2017 summer 
transfer window which took place between July 1,t 2017 and August 31, 2017. All of the 
players made a move to one of the top-15 most valuable and richest clubs in the world 
(Forbes.com, 2017), namely: Manchester United, Barcelona, Real Madrid, Bayern 
Munich, Manchester City, Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, Juventus, Tottenham Hotspur, 
Paris Saint-Germain, Borussia Dortmund, AC Milan, Atletico de Madrid, and West 
Ham United. All of these clubs compete in the five prominent European soccer leagues 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
 There were four main conditions to include a player in the data set. First, the 
player had to play in a senior league prior to the transfer; this allowed an accurate 
representation of his productivity compared to other players. Second, the transfer fee 
had to represent the true price of the player in the summer transfer window. This means 
no buyback clauses or no fees already agreed on for already loaned players waiting to 
be transferred. Third, transfermarkt.com had to have a record of the player’s previous 
contract length as well as his market value; in other words, we had to have complete 
data on the player to include him in the data set. Lastly, due to the sample size, we were 
unable to include goalkeepers at all since there were very few of them in the data set.
 There were some irregularities in the data set. The players who transferred “for free” 
also had expired contracts from their previous club, which means that both variables “fee” 
and “contractleft” are 0 in that instance. However, they still had a market value and a record 
of their previous season’s performance. There was one obvious outlier which is probably 
very apparent to all the soccer fans who are familiar with the summer transfer window. 
Neymar transferred for an astronomical fee of 222 million euros while the second highest 
fee in the transfer window paid was “only” 105 million euros for Ousmane Dembele from 
Borussia Dortmund to FC Barcelona. However, since Neymar is a superstar and one of the 
most valuable players in the world, his inclusion in the model makes sense, especially in a 
data set full of superstars. The complete list of players included is in the appendix. 
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Empirical Model and Results
We did two regression runs in our study. The first one, which also included aforementioned 
outlier Neymar, and the second one which did not include him in the regression. The 
results are as follows. 
Table 3: Regression Results
 Table 3 shows the model summary. R2 of 0.929 and adjusted R2 of 0.92 indicate 
great closeness of the data to the regression line. In other words, approximately 92% of the 
variability in the dependent variable around its mean is explained by this model and the 
independent variables used. In the context of this analysis, it means that our model makes 
a relatively precise prediction of the fee for the player given the independent variables 
used in our linear regression. Table 3 shows our analysis of variance of the model. With 
an F-statistic of 112.085, the model’s p-value is 0.000, which means that the whole model 
is indeed significant. In other words, our table shows that the relationship between the 
transfer fee and all the independent variables is statistically significant at a >99% level.
 When it comes to independent variables, all seem to be significant at the 98% 
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level with ContractLeft and GoogleResults showing as the most significant variables 
with the highest t-values –– 6.302 and 8.043 respectively. The lowest significance 
amongst all variables is 98.2%, suggesting that productivity is the least significant out 
of all, but is still 3.2% above than the 95% critical t-value, making the variable still 
statistically significant.
 The intercept of -9.942 says that when all dependent variables hold a value of 
zero, the player has a negative value. However, since our conditions clearly state that all 
the buying clubs are in top-15 most valuable and richest clubs in the world, and only the 
players with at least a year of professional career are included in the data set, a negative 
number in the intercept is not a problem. It is highly improbable that the player would 
hold a value of zero in all five independent variables, especially popularity (Google 
results) or his market value. 
 The beta for market value indicates that for every million that the soccer 
community from transfermarkt.com predicts, the value of the player rises by 0.529 
million in real transfer fee. This number suggests that the community might have a 
real power over the transfer fee of the player, as Herm et al. (2014) explained, since 
the number is used in the actual negotiation between the buying and selling clubs. The 
potential implication for the soccer managers around the world might be huge –– the 
fans can influence the transfer.
 With every year of the contract, the player’s price rises by 7.264 million. This 
heavily supports our prediction that the buying club is in a position of disadvantage since 
the premium for every year of the player’s current contract is more than 7 million euros. 
In other words, it seems to be very advantageous for a club to offer long-term contracts 
to its players. If the selling club decides to hold on to the player instead of selling him, 
the premium for doing that is 7.264 million per year. On the top of that, provided that 
the selling club will not bring in a replacement, wages are a significant expense as well.
Per every 10,000 Google results, the player’s price increases by 0.111 million. Popularity 
seems to significantly increase a player’s cost on the market. With a mean value of 
approximately 611,416 Google searches, an average player’s cost in one of the richest 
clubs in the world rises by 6.78 million euros. Mass media and reporting seem to have a 
real impact on the future transfer fee of the player.
 The last independent variable in our regression equation is race. If the player is 
black, his transfer fee increases by 10.581 million, which supports Szymanski’s (2000) 
findings, but in a different way than maybe expected. Szymanski concluded that the 
clubs with more black players perform better, and those clubs who do not have as many 
black players pay the premium for not being successful by not having black players in 
the team. In our model, the situation seems to be the other way around –– and the clubs 
realize that black players cost more possibly because of their better performances or 
physical ability (which, however, we cannot confirm by our model). 
 Exclusion of Neymar produced surprising results. To compare, the following 
empirical model regression equation includes Neymar, the record-holder in the highest 
transfer fee in history, in the data set:
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Fee = -9.942 + 0.529MarketValue + 7.264ContractLeft + 0.111GoogleResults + 
0.585Productivity + 10.581Race + ε,
and the following regression equation does not include Neymar in the data set:
Fee = -9.874 + 0.534MarketValue + 7.243ContractLeft + 0.106GoogleResults + 
0.591Productivity + 10.686Race + ε.
 The R2 decreased from 0.929 to 0.8, and the adjusted R2 from 0.92 to 0.776. 
P-value stayed the same, but F decreased by a great amount from 112.085 to 33.5. 
The model still makes a prediction of the fee and is still significant. The individual 
Beta values did not change outstandingly; the constant value increased, market value 
increased as well, contract left and Google results decreased, and both productivity 
and race increased; none of the changes deform the model. However, the t-value for 
Google results decreased from 8.043 to 2.309, which is surprising, and the significance 
decreased somewhat as well. 
 These changes might be explained by the fact that although Neymar is an outlier, 
he (and his values of independent variables) fit the model perfectly. The values did 
not increase or decrease individual Betas significantly. Thus, inclusion or exclusion of 
Neymar did not influence the model itself by great measures. A possible interpretation is 
that although his transfer fee might have been marked absolutely illogical and outrageous 
in general opinion of the soccer world, fans, managers, or coaches, his transfer value 
makes sense. 
Conclusion
 Based on a linear regression analysis of 49 players transferring to the richest 
and most valuable soccer clubs in the world, this paper has shown that the high amounts 
of money spent on soccer players in the top European teams is justified either by their 
productivity or their popularity. Race of the player and the years left on his contract 
seem to play a significant part in explaining the transfer fees as well. Moreover, the 
community valuation predictor and its significance to the regression equation suggests 
that the opinion of the soccer community really matters, and that the community 
prediction is a strong indicator of a real market value of the player, or how much any 
club is willing to pay for him, in the transfer fee. 
 The results are consistent with previous research. As Herm et al. (2014) pointed 
out, “The community has become the main source for reporting market values in the 
media and has a strong impact on the real sports economy. In fact, it is used in real 
market transactions and wage negotiations, indicating the power of crowd wisdom in the 
sports management context” (p. 490). The results seem to suggest that this is true, and 
the soccer community has much more power over the transfer fees than people that are a 
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part of it might think. Not only does the market value on transfermarkt.com successfully 
predict the transfer fees, it also plays an important role in an actual transfer. 
  As several researchers pointed out, one variable, years on the contract left, 
seems to be crucial in any regression model predicting transfer fees (Carmicheal et al, 
1999; Frick, 2007), but the details of these contracts often remain private (Carmicheal 
et al, 1999). This fact has made a complete analysis with this variable almost impossible 
in the past, especially when players from lesser-known leagues are included in the data 
set. However, this study analyzed only the players coming into the biggest clubs in 
the world, and the data on such players’ contracts are usually available to the public. 
Our research suggests that the time until contract expiration is significant and directly 
influences the transfer fee the selling club demands from the buying club.
 One of the most crucial findings of this study is the fact that we can confirm 
Garcia-del-Barrio’s and Pujol’s (2004; 2007) theory that popularity, as measured by 
the number of results on Google, influences the economics of soccer. Since then, the 
variable “Google results” as a predictor of popularity has been used in several studies 
(Lehmann & Schulze, 2008; Herm et al., 2014; Muller et al., 2017) in some form, and all 
of these studies found a connection between the player’s popularity and his transfer fee 
and/or salary. Our findings support this conclusion with the number of Google searches 
being one of the main predictors of the transfer fee for the player in our model.
 If the soccer community thought that the amount of money paid for Neymar did 
not make sense, our study hints that they might have been mistaken. With the coefficients 
having almost the same values with or without his inclusion in our sample, and with 
both lower R2 and lower adjusted R2 model significance without his inclusion, the model 
seems to justify Neymar’s high transfer fee. In addition, the model itself seems to be 
weaker if Neymar is excluded as hinted by the F-test. The model seems to be stronger 
with his inclusion even though he is technically a sole outlier in our data set. 
 To confirm the findings of this study, more research should be done on the topic, 
ideally one combining a data-driven approach and a community valuation approach in 
the model for the richest and the most valuable clubs in the world. In addition, a study 
with a larger sample size would be welcome. However, since the top clubs buy only a 
few players each year, such a data set would be rather difficult to obtain, especially as 
there is clearly inflation present (Dobson & :Gerrard, 1999) in the soccer transfer market 
making it difficult to compare data from several transfer windows. This fact also hints at 
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Appendix D: Regression 2 Output
